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GRAND JURY-IRREGULARITIES IN FUNCTION-SUBSTITUTION OF GRAND
JURORS-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the un-
precedented substitution of six grand jurors one year after the origi-
nal panel had been sworn and begun its work was prejudicial to the
defendant and necessitated the invalidation of the investigating
grand jury's presentment and the subsequent indictment based on
that presentment.
Commonwealth v. Levinson, 389 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1978).
in early January, 1974, an investigating grand jury' was sworn and
later charged to conduct an investigation of alleged corruption in
the City of Philadelphia's local government. Between May, 1974,
and January, 1975, one grand juror died and five others were ex-
cused from service. These grand jurors were replaced by six addi-
tional individuals and the reconstituted grand jury was again spe-
cially charged. I
Thereafter, the reconstituted grand jury continued its investiga-
tion and proceedings which resulted in a presentment favoring the
indictment of Hillel Levinson' for perjury, false swearing, extortion,
and illegal political activities.3 Levinson was indicted accordingly,
and unsuccessfully moved to quash the indictment. He then moved
for certification' of three questions5 to the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania.
1. The 1974 Investigating Grand Jury was convened to conduct"a special inveitigation and
was selected according to the normal calendar of court business. A special grand jury is one
that is specially selected at a time other than that designated by the court's calendar. See
Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 568, 185 A.2d 143 (1962) (distinguishing the two types of investi-
gating grand juries).
2. Hillel Levinson was the Managing Director of the City of Philadelphia. Commonwealth
v. Levinson, 389 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1978).
3. These charges arose out of Levinson's alleged solicitation of certain architects doing
business with the City of Philadelphia to buy tickets to a Democratic fund raising dinner
during the 1972 presidential campaign, and his allegedly inconsistent testimony before the
1972 and 1974 investigating grand juries. Id. at 1064.
4. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (Purdon Supp. 1978), which gives the trial judge
the authority to certify certain issues to the superior court.
5. Levinson claimed that (1) he was denied due process of the law by the refusal to allow
him to examine the grand jury minutes which denied him a preliminary hearing; (2) the
substitution of six jurors who were sworn January 15, 1975, was unauthorized under the laws
of Pennsylvania; and (3) a former grand juror who was present when the 1974 Investigating
Grand Jury voted on the Fourteenth Presentments was an unauthorized person in the grand
jury room, and therefore the indictment should have been dismissed. 389 A.2d at 1064.
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After granting the motion for certification and allowing the ap-
peal, the superior court reversed the trial court's order and quashed
the indictment on the ground that the substitution of the grand
jurors was unauthorized under the laws of Pennsylvania. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania granted the Commonwealth's petition
for leave to appeal,7 and affirmed the decision of the superior court,
holding that the substitution of the six grand jurors was prejudicial
to the defendant and unprecedented in Pennsylvania law.
Writing for the majority, Justice Manderino first noted the argu-
ments raised by the prosecution. The prosecution initially con-
tended that the substitution of the jurors was statutorily authorized,
or in the absence of statutory authority, that the supervising judge
had inherent discretionary power to add members to the grand jury.,
Next, the prosecution contended that if the substitutions were ille-
gal, the new grand jurors should be afforded de facto legitimacy.
Alternatively, the prosecution argued that even if the addition of the
new jurors was unlawful, the presentment was not defective since
the defendant failed to show prejudice, and even if the presentment
was defective, this defect was cured by the subsequent indictment
of the regular grand jury.'0
In considering the prosecution's first contention, the court con-
strued the Act of March 31, 1860," which authorized the substitu-
tion of grand or petit jurors. The majority concluded that such
6. Commonwealth v. Levinson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 387, 362 A.2d 1080, af'd, 389 A.2d 1062
(Pa. 1978). The superior court reached this conclusion because Rule 201 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of CriminalProcedure provides that a grand jury shall consist of not less than fifteen
nor more than twenty-three members. The 1974 Investigating Grand Jury originally impa-
neled twenty-three jurors. Therefore, even without the six jurors excused in January of 1975
and two other original jurors who were subsequently excused, the panel would have met the
minimum standard of required members set forth by the rules.
7. 389 A.2d at 1064.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1064-65.
10. Id.
11. The Act of March 31, 1860, Pub. L. No. 427, reads as follows:
All courts of criminal jurisdiction of this commonwealth shall be and are hereby
authorized and required, when occasion shall render the same necessary, to order a
tales de circumstantibus, either for the grand or petit jury, and all talesmen shall be
liable to the same challenges, fines and penalties as the principal jurors: Provided, that
nothing herein contained shall repeal or alter the provisions of... "An act establish-
ing a mode of drawing and selecting jurors in and for the city and county of Philadel-
phia."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1152, 1153 (Purdon 1962) (partially repealed by Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure 1109 and 1125(3)).
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substitutions are authorized only when the panef from which the
jury is to be selected falls below the number that is necessary to
form a legal jury, but that no substitutions can occur after the
original jury has been sworn and begun its work.' 2 To illustrate the
absurdity of permitting substitutions after the original panel has
been sworn, Justice Manderino hypothesized that if the statute per-
mits the substitution of grand jurors, it also permits the substitution
of petit jurors after they have begun to hear the evidence. Justice
Manderino summarily stated that such a proposition was so at odds
with our concept of trial by jury that it required no further com-
ment.' 3 To further support his conclusion, Justice Manderino ac-
knowledged the common law rule which required that the jury be
dismissed if a juror failed to appear after being sworn.' 4 To temper
the harshness of this common law rule, he noted that the legislature
enacted Rule 1108, which provides for alternate petit jurors. 5 Man-
derino maintained, however, that grand juries have eight built-in
alternatives since twenty-three may be chosen but only fifteen are
required for a legal quorum.'6 Thus, he reasoned, a statutory enact-
ment similar to Rule 1108 for grand juries is unnecessary.
Justice Manderino then dismissed the Commonwealth's conten-
tion that the supervising judge had the inherent authority to substi-
tute the jurors by distinguishing In re January 1974 Philadelphia
County Grand Jury Investigation. '1 He maintained that
12. 389 A.2d at 1066.
13. Id. at 1065.
14. For a discussion of the common law rule regarding the dismissal of the entire jury ii
one of the jurors does not complete his service, see Lillie v. American Can & Foundry, 209
Pa. 161, 58 A. 272 (1904); Pennell v. Percival, 13 Pa. 196 (1850).
15. PA. R. CrIM. P. 1108.
16. In essence, the majority derived this line of reasoning from the decision of the superior
court. See Commonwealth v. Levinson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 387, 401, 362 A.2d 1080, 1088
(1976), aff'd, 389 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1978). The superior court compared the statute with PA. R.
CriM. P. 201 and 210, and concluded that the grand jury can consist of fifteen to twenty-three
members, although only twelve are required to vote in favor of returning an indictment. With
this latitude built into the operation of the grand jury, the superior court believed that any
addition to the original panel would not have been necessary even if there had been statutory
authority for doing so. See note 6 supra.
17. 458 Pa. 586, 328 A.2d 485 (1974). In Philadelphia County, the authority of the 1974
Investigating Grand Jury was questioned by nine subpoenaed witnesses because the trial
judge ordered its formation and delineated its course of investigation. Normally, an investi-
gating grand jury is created on the request of the executive branch (usually the attorney




Philadelphia County held only that a supervising judge could, on his
own motion, initiate a grand jury investigation, and thus that case
had no bearing on whether a judge has authority to add to a jury's
complement after it has been sworn. Manderino likewise distin-
guished State Dental Council and Examining Board v. Pollack,"
contending that under Pollack the acts of de facto officials are given
effect only when the officials act from the inception of the proceed-
ing which is being challenged. Justice Manderino concluded, there-
fore, that the de facto rule should not be applied where, as in
Levinson, such persons act as public officials for only part of the
relevant proceeding." The majority then proceeded to illustrate the
manner in which the defendant was prejudiced by the presence of
the six substituted grand jurors. First, the court reasoned, since no
common law authority could be found for the substitution of jurors,
these jurors represented unauthorized persons in the jury room and
thereby prejudiced the defendant by participating in the voting for
the presentment. 20 Second, the court acknowledged the holding of
United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson," in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that every
grand juror need not be in attendance for the presentation of each
piece of evidence considered by the jury. However, the majority
distinguished Thompson, concluding that in the instant case a sub-
stantial percentage of the jury was absent from a significant portion
of the presentation of the evidence, thus causing prejudice to the
defendant.
Finally, the majority was not persuaded that the defect in the
presentment was cured by the subsequent indictment. To accept
such a contention would, according to the court, result in elevating
18. 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974) (defendant questioned the authority of some of the
board members).
19. The reason for treating de facto officials as de jure officials is to insulate de facto
officials from repetitious suits for official acts while in office, when it is later discovered that
the official was not authorized to hold that office as a de jure official. Id.
20. Compare Commonwealth v. Columbia Inv. Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974)
(permitting a court stenographer to be present during the hearing of evidence), and Common-
wealth v. Hegedus, 44 Pa. Super. Ct., 157, 165 (1910) (warning against the impropriety of a
stenographer's presence during grand jury deliberations and voting) with Levinson. Rule 209
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permits only the jury to be present during
deliberations or voting. The majority admitted that this rule specifically applies to indicting
grand juries, but asserted that it was equally applicable to investigating grand juries. 389 A.2d
at 1069.
21. 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944).
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investigating grand juries above the law." Nor was the majority
persuaded that United States v. Calandra,2 3 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a grand jury can hear evidence
seized in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, compelled
a contrary result. Rather, Justice Manderino reasoned that the
Calandra Court's interest in the orderly progress of grand jury inves-
tigations would be furthered if the Levinson indictment were
quashed, since it would assure regularity in the formulation and
proceeding of the investigating grand jury.24Justice Roberts in his dissent" stated that the indictment should
not have been quashed on the basis of the substitution of the six
grand jurors since the ramifications of that holding would be to
delay the administration of justice and to create remedies for rights
that have not been injured. 2 His argument for sustaining the indict-
ment was based on the observation that federal courts have not
quashed indictments for the substitution of grand jurors,27 for the
failure of all grand jurors to hear all of the evidence against a defen-
dant, 8 or for the prosecution's summation of the evidence for the
jurors. 2 Finally, Roberts agreed with the prosecution that Calandra
gives a grand jury greater latitude since a grand jury proceeding is
22. But see Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 179, 154 A.2d 57 (1959) (defen-
dant not prejudiced by remarks made by the governor on television the night before. grand
jury was to convene); Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952)
(defendant not prejudiced before indicting grand jury because of contempt citation he re-
ceived for refusing to testify before the investigating grand jury).
23. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, the Supreme Court held that evidence which was
seized in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights should not be excluded from
a grand jury proceeding.
24. 389 A.2d at 1070.
25. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). (Justice O'Brien joined in Justice Roberts' dissent).
26. Id. at 1072. See In re Meckley, 50 F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Pa. 1943). In Meckley, the
substitution of grand jurors was based on a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 419, 421 (1940)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (1970)). A close reading of the federal statute reveals
that it closely resembles Pennsylvania's statute, which authorized the calling of talesmen.
But the important statute in Meckley was that which specifically allowed the replacement
of a grand juror at any time during the proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 421 (1940) (current version
at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g)). Pennsylvania has no analogous statute or rule at this time.
27. United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 790 (1944) (no prejudice to the defendant when seven jurors missed various portions of'
the testimony since the collective mind of the jury was intact).
28. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1974) (court held it permissible
for the prosecuting attorney to summarize the parts of the testimony for grand jurors even
though they had all heard the testimony when it was originally given and had entire record
available for consultation).
29. See note 23 supra.
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an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted,
not an adversary proceeding in which guilt or innocence is adjudi-
cated. 30
In his dissent,3' Justice Pomeroy stated that the indictment
should be sustained because the addition of the six jurors was
clearly harmless error. Pomeroy maintained that the investigating
grand jury in Levinson had, at all times, maintained a legal quorum,
and that the indicting grand jury had other evidence on which to
base its indictment aside from the allegedly invalid presentment.
The majority, he stated, had overlooked the difference between in-
vestigating grand juries and indicting grand juries, and relied to a
certain extent on precedent applicable solely to indicting grand ju-
ries .3
The full impact of Commonwealth v. Levinson can be understood
only in light of the functioning of grand juries in Pennsylvania.
Called at the request of the attorney general 33 or at the discretion
of the supervising judge, 34 a grand jury investigation probes specific
areas of criminal conduct that are not easily examined by regular
investigative processes. 31 In order to accomplish this end, the inves-
tigating grand juries are given the power to subpoena witnesses and
documents, and to compel compliance with the threat of contempt.
Since investigating grand juries possess these broad powers ena-
bling them to perform extensive research about the subject of their
investigations, their presentments3 are generally accepted by in-
30. Justice Roberts further maintained that the supervising judge must have the author-
ity to take reasonably necessary steps to permit an extended grand jury to complete its work.
In this respect, Justice Roberts considered criminal activity, particularly governmental cor-
ruption, to be too extensive and too involved to require all grand jurors to sit for the entire
period of time. 389 A.2d at 1072 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). (Justice O'Brien also joined in Justice Pomeroy's dis-
sent).
32. Id. at 1073.
33. See Segal, Spivak & Costello, Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation in Pennsylvania,
35 TEMP. L.Q. 73 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Segal], for a discussion of the formation of an
investigating grand jury.
34. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
35. See Segal, supra note 32, at 79.
36. Presentments are reports or conclusions of a grand jury investigation. A presentment
is similar to an indictment in that it contains specific charges of crimes and accuses an
individual of those crimes, but unlike an indictment, it lacks the legal sufficiency to initiate
criminal proceedings. For a discussion of grand jury investigations, see Dession & Cohen, The
Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687 (1932).
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dicting grand juries as instructions for a true bill of indictment. In
fact, in Commonwealth v. Webster 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recognized that in many instances where an indicting grand
jury receives a presentment from an investigating grand jury, the
indicting grand jury will merely "rubber stamp" the presentment
into an indictment.18 Moreover, in Commonwealth v. McCloskey,u
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that an indicting grand
jury can accept an investigating grand jury's presentment in lieu of
a complaint and preliminary hearing without violating the due pro-
cess requirements of the Constitution.'" Thus, as a result of the force
and effect given to the presentments of investigating grand juries,
courts are faced with the problem of determining whether irregulari-
ties in the functioning of investigating grand juries require an invali-
dation of the presentment and quashing of the subsequent indict-
ment. Specifically, the Levinson court was confronted with the
problem of whether the substitution of six grand jurors one year
after the investigation began was such an irregularity that it re-
quired the invalidation of the presentment and corresponding in-
dictment. The Levinson court concluded that the irregularity was
of such magnitude that it did require invalidation of the present-
ment and subsequent indictment.
In the past, Pennsylvania courts have carefully scrutinized cases
involving an alleged pre-indictment irregularity and, where possi-
ble, have found a basis for sustaining the indictment. For example,
in Commonwealth v. Gross,4 the superior court held that an investi-
gating grand jury's violation of the defendant's fifth amendment
rights was a harmless pre-indictment irregularity. The superior
court reasoned that other evidence existed upon which the indicting
grand jury could have based its decision, and therefore it should be
presumed that the tainted presentment did not provide the main
37. 462 Pa. 125, 337 A.2d 914 (1975) (court sustained information as a valid way to begin
criminal proceedings and added that indictments are little more than investigating grand jury
presentments which are "rubber-stamped" into legal indictments by indicting grand juries).
38. Id. at 132, 337 A.2d at 917.
39. 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764 (1974) (trial court's acceptance of investigating grand jury's
presentment in lieu of a complaint and preliminary hearing was not a violation of due pro-
cess).
40. Id. at 140, 277 A.2d at 776.
41. 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952) (court held defendant was not prejudiced
because the indictment against him was based on a presentment which stated that he refused
to testify before the indicting grand jury).
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basis for the indictments.2 This ruling was somewhat clarified in
Commonwealth v. Evans,4" where the superior court stated that
preindictment irregularities should not result in the quashing of an
indictment unless the irregularities were clearly prejudicial to the
defendant.4 Moreover, several defendants have unsuccessfully at-
tempted to quash indictments based upon insufficient warnings
against self-incrimination prior to testifying before a grand jury."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has maintained that since a
grand jury proceeding is an ex parte, non adversary proceeding, the
warnings which were given to the defendants were sufficient safe-
guards against self-incrimination, and were not required to be as
extensive as those afforded to defendants in custodial interroga-
tions" or adversarial proceedings. 7 Although these decisions illus-
trate the trend in Pennsylvania to uphold indictments, they also
reveal that Pennsylvania courts recognize the possibility that preju-
dicial pre-indictment irregularities may be grounds for quashing an
indictment. Levinson represents a justifiable departure from the
trend to uphold indictments, since in Levinson the pre-indictment
irregularities were distinguishable from those irregularities involved
in prior decisions and, more importantly, were prejudicial to the
defendant.
In prior decisions, the action or inaction of a legally constituted
grand jury was attacked as being without the bounds of the grand
jury's authority. In Levinson, however, the focus of attack was not
upon the action of a legally constituted grand jury, but rather upon
the legality of the constitution of the jury itself: it is in this distinc-
tion that the prejudice present in Levinson emanates. Six grand
jurors who had neither seen nor heard the defendant testify in 1974
were asked to return a presentment for perjury. Since only twelve
jurors are required to vote in favor of returning a presentment, the
votes of these six substituted jurors played a crucial role in the
42. Id. at 92, 92 A.2d at 254.
43. 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 179, 154 A.2d 57 (1959) (court held that there was no prejudice to
the defendant because the governor made inflammatory remarks about the defendant on
television the night before the grand jury convened).
44. Id. at 201, 154 A.2d at 69.
45. See notes 20 & 27 supra.
46. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warnings required prior to custodial
interrogation).
47. See Commonwealth v.. Columbia Inv. Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974), for a
discussion of warnings required prior to testifying before a grand jury.
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decision to indict. As Justice Manderino pointed out, investigating
grand juries investigate areas of suspected criminal activity, and
evidence concerning any one individual may contain much that is
exculpatory as well as that which is inculpatory. 8 Thus, as a result
of the inability of these six jurors to hear possible exculpatory evi-
dence as well as their lack of opportunity to fully observe the defen-
dant's demeanor and ability to answer questions, the probability of
prejudice was sufficiently great to warrant the quashing of the pres-
entment and subsequent indictment.
Although federal courts have permitted grand jurors to be substi-
tuted after some evidence has been heard,4" and have permitted the
summation of evidence to the grand jury to a prosecuting attorney,'
reasoning in these federal decisions are inapplicable to the Levinson
situation. First, unlike any Pennsylvania statute, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure specifically provide for the substitution of
grand jurors at any time.' Moreover, United States v. Mitchell,5 2
the decision cited by the dissent as permitting a summation of the
evidence, permitted the summation only for jurors who had heard
the entire testimony throughout the course of the proceeding, and
the summation was used solely to refresh their memories. In
Thompson,5 3 the court of appeals held that not all grand jurors must
hear all of the evidence; but the Thompson court, speaking through
Judge Learned Hand, did acknowledge that in limited instances it
might be possible that the absence of some of the grand jurors could
48. 389 A.2d at 1068.
49. In re Meckley, 50 F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Pa. 1943). Because federal law required a
minimum of sixteen grand jurors, the Meckley court selected two additional jurors after two
of the original seventeen grand jurors were excused, even though the jury had begun to hear
testimony.
50. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1974) (court held it permissible
for the prosecuting attorney to summarize parts of the testimony for grand jurors even though
they had all heard the testimony when it was originally given and had the entire record
available for consultation).
51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g) (1972) which reads as follows:
A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the court but no grand jury may serve more
than 18 months. The tenure and powers of a grand jury are not affected by the begin-
ning of expiration of a term of court. At any time for cause shown the court may excuse
a juror either temporarily or permanently, and in the latter event the court may
impanel another person in place of the juror excused.
52. See note 50 supra.
53. United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 790 (1944) (no prejudice to the defendant when seven jurors missed various portions of
the testimony since the collective mind of the jury was intact).
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prejudice the defendant if the evidence missed by those jurors was
exculpatory in nature.54 The majority in Levinson reasoned that the
Thompson holding was applied to indicting grand juries rather than
investigating grand juries, and further, that the exception acknowl-
edged by Judge Hand was more applicable to investigating grand
juries, since investigating grand juries hear evidence which is excul-
patory as well as that which is inculpatory.5 Therefore, even if'
Thompson were to be controlling in Levinson, Hand's exception
would apply since Levinson involved an investigating rather than an
indicting grand jury.
Finally, United States v. Calandra56 and its progeny support the
invalidation of the presentment and the subsequent indictment in
Levinson. Although the Calandra court upheld an indictment de-
spite the presence of illegally seized evidence, the Court added a
caveat that grand juries themselves may not violate a valid privilege
established by the Constitution, statute or the common law. 7 This
caveat was relied upon in United States v. Hinton"' and
Commonwealth v. Field,5" and in each of these cases indictments
were quashed since the grand juries themselves obtained evidence
by violating the defendants' fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Apparently, it was the illegal action of the grand
juries in obtaining the evidence which induced the Hinton and Field
courts to invalidate the presentment and indictments." In
Levinson, since the judge lacked both the statutory and inherent
authority to add six grand jurors, 2 at no time was the 1974 Investi-
gating Grand Jury acting legally. This is distinguishable from the
54. Id. at 607.
55. 389 A.2d at 1068.
56. 414 U.S. 338.
57. Id. at 346.
58. 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976) (indicting grand jury compelled defendant to testify in
violation of her fifth amendment rights).
59. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 53, 331 A.2d 744 (1974). In Field, the investigating grand jury
compelled the defendant to testify without even minimal warnings against self-incrimination.
The superior court held this to be a violation of Field's fifth amendment rights; therefore,
the presentment and indictment based on that presentment were quashed.
60. Each court distinguished Hinton and Field from Calandra because the grand jury in
Calandra only viewed the evidence which was illegally obtained by other sources, while the
grand juries in Hinton and Field themselves illegally obtained the evidence.
61. The court in Field invalidated both a presentment and an indictment. 231 Pa. Super.
Ct. 53, 331 A.3d 744 (1974). On the other hand, the court in Hinton was only concerned with
an indictment. 543 F.2d at 1002.
62. 389 A.2d at 1065.
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situation in Calandra where the grand jury was not considered to
have acted illegally by merely viewing evidence which was illegally
seized in violation of the defendants' fourth amendment right. How-
ever, in Hinton and Field, the grand juries themselves violated the
defendants' fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination by
compelling them to testify at the grand jury proceeding. Since in
Levinson the grand jury was not a legally constituted one, therefore,
all of its actions were illegal. Thus, as Hinton and Field point out,
where a grand jury acts illegally, the presentment handed down by
it must be invalidated.
Commonwealth v. Levinson clearly demonstrates that there is no
authority in Pennsylvania to substitute grand jurors after the panel
has been sworn and begun its work. Pennsylvania courts must now
accept the rationale of Levinson and closely scrutinize any juror
substitutions to insure that the defendant is not thereby prejudiced.
Although the Levinson principle may hamper the functions of grand
juries which cannot maintain a quorum for their entire term, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that the protection
afforded to criminal defendants during the grand jury process is of
the utmost importance; as a result, Levinson will endure in the
absence of legislative response.
Richard J. Schubert
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